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Abstract 
 
We follow a two-stage procedure to examine for the first time the cost efficiency of 
Greek cooperative banks. Our sample consists of 16 banks over the period 2000-2004. 
We first use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate the technical, allocative 
and cost efficiency for each bank in sample. Then, we use Tobit regression to 
determine the impact of internal and external factors on banks’ efficiency. The results 
of DEA indicate that Greek cooperative banks could improve their cost efficiency by 
17.7% on average as well as that the dominant source of cost inefficiency is allocative 
rather than technical. The results of Tobit regression indicate that size has a positive 
impact on all measures of efficiency. However, the impact of capitalization, branches 
and ATMs depends on the efficiency measure and whether we control for market 
conditions or not. GDP per capita has a negative and significant impact on all 
measures of efficiency, while unemployment rate has also a negative and significant 
impact on technical and cost efficiency although not on allocative efficiency. Finally, 
banks operating in regions with higher disposal income of households in relation to 
the total disposal income of households in Greece are more efficient in terms of 
allocative and cost efficiency.  
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1. Introduction  
Over the last years, several papers have examined the efficiency of banks using either 
parametric (e.g. stochastic frontier analysis, thick frontier approach, distribution free 
approach) or non-parametric (e.g. data envelopment analysis-DEA) techniques1. 
However, most of these studies focus on commercial banks, while considerably less 
studies examine the efficiency of cooperative banks (e.g. Molyneux and Williams, 
2005; Bos and Kool, 2006) or consider them in comparisons with other types of banks 
(e.g. Girardone et al., 2006). Some of the studies that examine cooperative banks 
focus on individual countries such as U.S. (Rezvanian et al., 1996), Netherlands (Bos 
and Kool, 2006), Italy (Altunbas et al., 1994), Finland (Kolari and Zardkoohi, 1990), 
and Germany (Lang and Welzel, 1996), while others consider various EU countries 
(e.g. Molyneux and Williams, 2005; Cavallo and Rossi, 2002; Weill, 2004; Girardone 
et al., 2006).   
The purpose of the present paper is to provide additional evidence by 
examining the Greek cooperative banking sector. Our study has two overall 
objectives. The first is the estimation of the cost efficiency of Greek cooperative 
banks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that undertakes such an 
analysis in Greece, in contrast to previous studies that focus on commercial banks 
(e.g. Karafolas and Mantakas, 1996; Noulas, 1997, 2001; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 
2001; Christopoulos et al., 2002; Tsionas et al., 2003; Halkos and Salamouris, 2004; 
Apergis and Rezitis, 2004; Kamberoglou et al., 2004; Rezitis, 2006; Pasiouras, 2006). 
Furthermore, the previously mentioned studies, which examine various EU 
cooperative banking sectors (e.g. Girardone et al., 2006), have traditionally excluded 
Greek banks, due to difficulties in collecting data which are not available in 
commercial databases such as Bankscope.  
Our second objective lies on the investigation of the factors that have an 
impact on the efficiency of Greek cooperative banks. We consider several external 
and internal factors as explanatory variables. External factors are market-specific and 
reflect various aspects such as the economic well-being of the residents, 
unemployment, and investments. Since the banks in the sample operate in 16 
prefectures from 11 regions, local market economic conditions might have an impact 
on their cost efficiency. In a similar manner, the importance of considering 
                                                 
1 Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Goddard et al. (2001) provide key discussions and comparison of 
these methods.  
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environmental variables during the estimation of efficiency has been recognized in 
early cross-country studies (e.g. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Lozano-Vivas et 
al., 2002) and examined in most of the recent cross-country studies (e.g. Hauner, 
2005; Fries and Taci, 2005; Pasiouras, 2007). However, to the best of our knowledge, 
only Bos and Kool (2006) have examined the impact of local market conditions on the 
efficiency of cooperative banks, while focusing on Netherlands. Internal factors 
correspond to both financial and non-financial bank-specific characteristics.    
Our study is particularly important because, despite their relatively small 
market share in comparison to commercial banks, Greek cooperative banks play an 
important role in the development of the local economy. They mainly focus on small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) and private citizens, provide support, and encourage 
the development of local enterprises. By offering competitive banking products 
adjusted to local conditions and with operational features, they attempt to be 
established as reliable, friendly, and flexible. Hence, the level of their efficiency and 
the analysis of its determinants can be of special interest to several stakeholders such 
as customers-members, bank managers, local community, and of course bank 
regulators.  
 The rest of the paper is structure as follows. Section 2 provides a brief note on 
the Greek cooperative banking sector. Section 3 describes the data and methodology, 
while Section 4 discusses the empirical results. The conclusions are presented in 
Section 5.  
 
2. A brief note on the Greek cooperative banking sector  
The Greek cooperative banking industry has a history of approximately ten years. 
While a few institutions were established earlier2, they were operating as credit 
cooperatives until the early 1990s when they obtained a licence to operate as 
cooperative banks. More precisely, according to the regulations, credit cooperatives 
that raise the minimum capital required and fulfil certain condition can apply and 
obtain the permit from the Bank of Greece to operate as credit institutions, allowing 
them to offer all banking activities like any commercial bank within the borders of the 
                                                 
2 The Co-operative Bank of Lamia launched its activities as the Credit Co-operative of “Technicians of 
Lamia” in 1990, which makes it the oldest existing Co-operative in Greece. It evolved into a Credit 
Institution in 1993. The Co-operative Bank of Ioannina was initially founded in 1978 as a Credit Co-
operative under the name of “Development Co-operation of the Prefecture of Ioannina”. It evolved into 
a Credit Institution in 1993 (Association of Greek Cooperative Banks, 2005).  
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area in which they are activated. Those credit cooperatives that obtain a licence to 
operate as credit institutions do not alter their legal status and can make use of the 
term “Cooperative Bank”3. 
Currently, there are 16 cooperative banks operating in Greece with a total 
network of 126 branches, offering their services in the largest part of the country. 
From the above-mentioned banks, two are qualified to operate all over the country 
while another four have reached the required cooperative capital allowing them to 
extent their operations in the neighbouring regions. There are also sixteen credit 
cooperatives, which have not yet fulfil the requirements that will allow them to 
operate as cooperative banks, and their services are limited in grating loans or 
providing other financial facilities to their members. 
 
[Insert Table 1 Around Here] 
 
Although cooperative banks have experienced a small increase in their market 
share over the last years, they still hold a relatively small amount of total assets in the 
Greek banking sector that at the end of 2005 was equal to 0.8% (Table 1). 
Nevertheless, despite the competition that they face, cooperative banks have 
demonstrated an improvement in most financial aspects over the last years. As Table 
2 indicates, between 2000 and 2004, net profit before taxes increased by 19.29%, 
assets by 30.61%, and deposits by 40.91%. Furthermore, over the same period 
branches increased by 16.67%, while personnel and members experienced an increase 
around 11.5%.     
 
 [Insert Table 2 Around Here] 
  
3. Methodology and data   
3.1 The two step approach  
Our analysis consists of two steps. First, we use DEA to measure the technical, 
allocative and cost efficiency of cooperative banks in Greece during 2000-2005. 
Then, the efficiency scores from step one are regressed on external and internal 
                                                 
3 The operation of Greek cooperative banks is governed by law 2076/92, which incorporated into 
Greek Law the European Union’s Directive 77/78 that defines the structure and operation of Credit 
Institutions, as well as Act. No 2258/2.11.1993, promulgated under the hands of the Governor of the 
Bank of Greece. 
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factors using Tobit regression as in Rezitis (2006), Havrylchyk (2006), Isik and 
Hassan (2003), Pasiouras (2006, 2007) among others. Pastor (2002) points out the 
following advantages of this procedure: (i) easy implementation, (ii) possibility of 
considering many environmental variables simultaneously, without increasing the 
number of efficient units, (iii) no need to know the orientation of the influence of each 
environmental variable, (iv) possibility of use when some (or all) of the 
environmental variables are common to sub-sets of individuals.  
 DEA is a mathematical programming approach for the development of 
production frontiers and the measurement of efficiency relative to the developed 
frontiers (Charnes et al., 1978). One of its well-known advantages, which is 
particularly relevant to our study, is that DEA works well with small samples. As 
Maudos et al. (2002) point out, “Of all the techniques for measuring efficiency, the 
one that requires the smallest number of observations is the non-parametric and 
deterministic DEA, as parametric techniques specify a large number of parameters, 
making it necessary to have available a large number of observations.” (p. 511). 
Another advantage of DEA is that there is no need to specify a particular functional 
form for the production frontier.  
To discuss DEA in more technical terms, let us assume that there data on K 
inputs and M outputs on each of N DMUs (i.e. banks). For the i-th bank these are 
represented by the vectors xi and yi, respectively. The NK × input matrix, X, and the 
NM ×  output matrix, Y, represent the data for all N banks. According to Charnes et 
al. (1978) the input oriented measure of a particular bank, under constant return to 
scales4 (CRS), is calculated as: 
                                                 
4Banker et al. (1984) suggested the use of variable returns to scale (VRS) that decomposes technical 
efficiency under CRS (TE-CRS) into a product of two components. The first is technical efficiency 
under VRS also known as pure technical efficiency (PTE) and the second is scale efficiency (SE) that 
refers to exploiting scale economies. The technical efficiency scores obtained under VRS are higher 
than or equal to those obtained under CRS and SE can be obtained by dividing TE-CRS with PTE. 
While several recent studies perform the analysis under VRS, others argue in favour of CRS rather than 
VRS. For example, Noulas (1997) points out that the assumption of CRS allows the comparison 
between small and large banks. In a sample where a few large banks are present, the use of VRS 
framework raises the possibility that these large banks will appear as being efficient for the simple 
reason that there are no truly efficient banks (Berg et al., 1991). Avkiran (1999) also mentions that 
under VRS each unit is compared only against other units of similar size, instead of against all units. 
Hence, the assumption of VRS is more suitable for large samples. Soteriou and Zenios (1999) argue 
that caution is necessary when using the VRS formulation. First, because the model orientation (i.e. 
input minimization or output maximization) becomes important. Second, because the use of weights 
restriction in the VRS assessment may lead to some other problematic results (Allen, 1997). On the 
basis of these arguments, we estimate our model under the assumption of CRS as Avkiran (1999), 
Noulas (1997, 2001), Ariff and Can (2007) among others.  
  6
 
                                                      θλθ ,Min  
s.t.  0≥+− λYyi  
       0≥− λθ Xxi  
0≥λ  
 
where 1≤θ  is the scalar efficient score and λ  is 1×Ν  vector of constants. If 
1=θ  the bank is efficient as it lies on the frontier, whereas if 1pθ  the bank is 
inefficient and needs a θ−1  reduction in the inputs levels to reach the frontier. The 
linear programming is being solved N times, once for each bank in sample, and a 
value of θ  is obtained for each bank representing its technical efficiency (TE) score.  
Then, in order to calculate allocative efficiency (AE), we assume that wi is a 
1×Ν  vector of input prices for the i-th bank and solve the following cost 
minimization DEA:  
 
∗′ iixi xw*,min λ  
st     0≥+− λYyi  
0≥+∗ λXxi  
0≥λ  
where ∗ix  (which is calculated by the LP) is the cost-minimizing vector of 
input quantities for the i-th bank, given the input prices iw and the output levels .iy  
The total cost efficiency (CE) of the i-th bank is calculated as 
iiii xwxwCE ′′= ∗ /  
That is, CE is the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost, for the i-th bank. 
The (input-mix) allocative efficiency (AE) is calculated as AE = CE/TE. All three 
  7
measures can take values between 0 and 1 with higher values indicating higher 
efficiency.  
 
3.2. Variables 
The first step in measuring efficiency using DEA is to specify the inputs and outputs 
of banks. As in most recent studies (e.g. Casu and Molyneux, 2003; Isik and Hassan, 
2003; Pasiouras, 2007) we adopt the intermediation approach, which assumes that 
banks act as financial intermediates that collect purchased funds and use labour 
capital to transform these funds to loans and other assets. The three inputs are: fixed 
assets (X1), deposits (X2) and number of employees (X3). The two outputs are: loans 
(Y1), and liquid assets & investments (Y2). The input prices are calculated as: 
depreciation expenses to fixed assets (P1), interest expenses to deposits (P2) and   
personnel expenses to number of employees (P3).  
 As mentioned earlier, in the second stage of the analysis we examine the 
impact of bank-specific factors and local market conditions on bank’s efficiency. In 
particular we use two financial5 and two non-financial bank-specific characteristics. 
SIZE measured by the logarithm of total assets is a proxy for size; EQAS calculated 
as equity capital to total assets is a measure of capital strength; ATMs and 
BRANCHES correspond to the number of ATMs and branches respectively. They 
both indicate the easy to access to the services of banks and potentially capture 
strategic decisions of bank management. For instance, in those regions in which the 
population density is low, banks might need an extensive network of branch offices to 
meet customer demand. However, extensive network will result in higher overheads 
and therefore lower cost efficiency. Hence, a high number of ATMs might be an 
alternative way to offer part of banks’ services at a lower cost.  
In an attempt to capture the impact of local market conditions on efficiency, 
we use four variables in total. GDPCAP is the GDP per capita; UNEMPL is the 
unemployment rate; INCOME corresponds to the disposal income of households6 in 
                                                 
5 Obviously several additional financial variables could be used. However, we avoid including 
variables that contain elements such as loans and deposits, that have been used as inputs/outputs in the 
first stage of the analysis to minimize potential heterogeneity concerns.  
6 Disposal income of households corresponds to the primary and secondary of households. It is 
calculated as: operating surplus and mixed income + compensation of employees (received) + property 
income (received) - property income (paid) + social benefits other than social benefits in kind 
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the region as a percentage of the total disposal income of households in Greece; 
INVGDP shows the total gross fixed capital formation (ie. new investments in fixed 
capital assets) as a percentage of GDP in the same geographical area.   
 
3.3. Data 
Our initial sample consists of all 16 Greek cooperative banks7 over the period 2000-
2004. However, the sample size varies by year due to data availability or zero values 
in the case of inputs/outputs8. The sample size per year is as follows: 14 (2000), 14 
(2001), 14 (2002), 15 (2003), 16 (2004). The financial data were extracted from 
income and balance sheet statements. Additional information for the number of 
ATMs, and the number of branches was collected either from the annual reports or 
were provided by the Association of Cooperative Banks of Greece (ACBG). Finally, 
data related to market conditions were obtained from the General Secretariat of 
National Statistical Service of Greece. With respect to the later, due to data 
availability only GDP per capita corresponds to the prefecture in which banks are 
headquartered and operate (e.g. Chania, Heraklion, etc). In all other cases (e.g. 
UNEMPL, INCOME), we use data for the general region (e.g. Crete) following the 
classifications of General Secretariat of National Statistical Service of Greece. Table 3 
presents descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation). Panel A shows data used 
in the first stage of the analysis (i.e. DEA), while Panel B reports data used in the 
second stage9 (i.e. Tobit regression).    
 
[Insert Table 3 Around Here] 
                                                                                                                                            
(received) + other current transfers (received) - current taxes on income wealth (paid) - social 
contribution (paid) - other current transfers (paid).  
7 While our sample appears small in absolute terms, it is comparable to previous studies that examine 
efficiency in the Greek commercial banking sector as well as in other countries. For example, Apergis 
and Rezitis (2004) and Rezitis (2006) examine six banks, Karafolas and Mantakas (1996) examine 
eleven banks, while the sample in Pasiouras (2006) ranges between twelve and eighteen banks. Several 
studies outside Greece have also used relatively small samples, including the study of Chu and Lim 
(1998) that examines as few as six banks, Drake (2001) that examines only nine UK banks and Neal 
(2004) that examines twelve Australian banks. After all, as mentioned in section 3.1 one of the most 
well known advantages of DEA is that it works well with small samples.  
8 The first year for which data were available for Cooperative Bank of Serres is 2004. As for banks 
with zero values in inputs/outputs these were excluded from the analysis in the respective years, 
because DEAP 2.1. (Coelli, 1996) cannot deal with zero and negative values. 
9At this point, we should mention that that we have smoothed all independent variables by replacing 
observations above the 95th percentile and below the 5th percentile with the corresponding values. This 
approach reduces the impact of outliers in the estimation of the parameters of the model while it allows 
retaining all observatories in sample. 
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4. Results 
As in Isik and Hassan (2002) among others, we estimate separate annual efficiency 
frontiers rather than a common frontier across time. Isik and Hassan (2002) point out 
the following two advantages of this approach. First, it is more flexible and thus more 
appropriate than estimating a single multiyear frontier for the banks in the sample. 
Second, it alleviates, at least to an extent, the problems related to the lack of random 
error in DEA by allowing an efficient bank in one year to be inefficient in another, 
under the assumption that the errors owing to luck or data problems are not consistent 
over time.  
Table 4 presents the average efficiency scores by year. The overall (cost) 
efficiency score ranges between 0.802 (2004) and 0.836 (2002) with an average equal 
to 0.823 over the period of our analysis. Thus, Greek cooperative banks could 
improve their cost efficiency by 17.7% on average or in other words, banks could 
have used only 82.3% of the resources actually employed (i.e. inputs) to produce the 
same level of outputs. In each year, allocative inefficiency is always higher than 
technical inefficiency, suggesting that the dominant source of cost inefficiency of 
Greek cooperative banks is allocative rather than technical. On average, banks in 
sample could improve technical efficiency by 7.9% and allocative efficiency by 
10.9%. This implies that the managers of banks were relatively good at using the 
minimum level of inputs at a given level of outputs but they were not that good at 
selecting the optimal mix of inputs given the prices.  
 
[Insert Table 4 Around Here] 
  
In order to investigate the determinants of efficiency we construct an 
econometric model with TE, AE and CE as dependent variables. As in previous 
studies, due to the limited nature of our efficiency measures (i.e. range between 0 and 
1) we use Tobit analysis. As Saxonhouse (1976) points out, heteroscedacity can 
emerge when estimated parameters are used as dependent variables in the second 
stage analysis. Thus, following Hauner (2005) and Pasiouras (2006, 2007), QML 
(Huber/White) standard errors and covariates are calculated. Panel A in Table 5 
shows the regression results when we consider only bank-specific attributes as 
independent variables. Panel B presents the results when both the bank-specific 
attributes and the variables that proxy for market conditions enter the equation.    
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[Insert Table 5 Around Here] 
 
EQAS is statistically significant and positive related to TE, indicating that 
well-capitalized cooperative banks are more technically efficient that is consistent 
with the results of previous studies (e.g. Isik and Hassan, 2003). However, the 
insignificant impact of EQAS on AE and CE indicates that the capitalization of banks 
does not influence their allocative and cost efficiency. LOGAS is statistically 
significant and positive related to all measures of efficiency. Hauner (2005) offers two 
potential explanations for which size could have a positive impact on cost efficiency. 
First, if it relates positively to market power, large banks should pay less for their 
inputs. Second, there might be increasing returns to scale through the allocation of 
fixed costs (e.g. for research or risk management) over a higher volume of services or 
from efficiency gains from a higher specialized workforce. The results also indicate 
that banks with a broader ATM network appear to be more efficient (in terms of TE 
and CE), whereas more branches reduce efficiency (TE and CE) that is consistent 
with the results of Bos and Cool (2006) in Netherlands. However, the impact of both 
ATM and BRANCHES on CE disappears when we control for market conditions.  
GDPCAP has a negative and statistically significant impact on all measures of 
efficiency, however the value of the coefficient is relatively small in all cases. INVDP 
is also negatively related to efficiency although insignificant in all cases. To some 
extend these results might be related to the findings of previous studies which report 
that in high growth and investment regions cost efficiency is relatively low (Maudos 
et al., 2002; Bos and Kool, 2006). Maudos et al. (2002) argue that under expansive 
demand conditions banks feel less pressure to control their costs and are therefore less 
cost efficient. However, in our case we also find that as the disposal income of 
households in the region relative to the total disposal income of households in Greece 
increases, allocative and cost efficiency also increase. Finally, we find that lower 
unemployment rate results in higher technical and cost efficiency.   
 
5. Conclusions  
Over the last years, Greek cooperative banks, which have a history of approximately 
ten years, have demonstrated an improvement in most financial aspects along with an 
increase in branches, personnel and members. Despite their importance for the local 
markets and enterprises, they have received significantly less attention than 
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commercial banks. Hence, in the present study, we followed a two-stage procedure 
and examined for the first time the efficiency of the Greek cooperative banking sector.  
Our sample consisted of the population of cooperative banks, a total of 16 
banks, operating in Greece over the period 2000-2004. We first use data envelopment 
analysis to estimate the efficient frontiers and determine the efficiency score for each 
bank in sample. We found that Greek cooperative banks could improve their cost 
efficiency by 17.7% on average or in other words they could have used only 82.3% of 
the resources actually employed (i.e. inputs) to produce the same level of outputs. We 
also found that allocative inefficiency was always higher than technical inefficiency. 
Thus, the managers of banks were relatively good at using the minimum level of 
inputs at a given level of outputs but they were not that good at selecting the optimal 
mix of inputs given the prices.  
In the second stage of our analysis, we used Tobit regression to determine the 
internal and external factors that had an impact on banks’ technical, allocative, and 
cost efficiency. We found that well-capitalized cooperative banks were more 
technically efficient although capitalization was not related to allocative and cost 
efficiency. Larger banks were more technical, allocative and cost efficient ones. 
Banks with a broader ATM network and less branches appeared to be more technical 
and cost efficient, however the impact of both ATMs and branches on cost efficiency 
disappeared when we controlled for market conditions.  
With respect to the local market conditions, GDP per capita had a negative and 
statistically significant impact on all measures of efficiency; however, the value of the 
coefficient was relatively small in all cases. Unemployment rate also had a negative 
and significant impact on technical and cost efficiency. Finally, banks operating in 
regions with higher disposal income of households in relation to the total disposal 
income of households in Greece, were more efficient in terms of allocative and cost 
efficiency.  
 Future work could extend our research in various directions not considered in 
this study. First, the efficiency of cooperative banks could be compared with that of 
commercial banks. Second, subject to data availability over a longer period that would 
result in a higher sample, one could estimate cost and profit efficiency using 
stochastic frontier analysis.  
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Table 1- Aggregate market shares (%) of different types of credit institutions operating in Greece 
  Assets   Loans   Deposits  
 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 
Commercial banks 82.1 80.9 81.2 84.5 85.1 84.9 82.6 81.8 80.5 
Foreign banks 9.3 10.0 10.1 9.4 8.8 8.8 7.3 8.2 9.1 
Co-operative banks 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Specialized Credit Institutions1 8.0 8.4 7.9 5.2 5.1 5.3 9.4 9.2 9.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: 1Postal Savings Bank and Deposits & Loans Fund, Source: Bank of Greece Annual Report (2004, 2005)  
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Table 2 – Basic figures of Greek Co-operative banks 2000-2004 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average 
increase  
2000-04 
Assets 548.2 734.82 926.09 1,244.74 1,593.49 30.61% 
Loans 383.28 530.36 721.43 956.03 1,270.08 34.94% 
Deposits 324.56 491.00 682.08 975.76 1,272.41 40.91% 
Equity capital 196.70 204.65 214.81 233.48 264.60 7.65% 
Cooperative capital 132.03 139.79 145.69 151.04 165.68 9.69% 
Gross profit 34.95 38.21 47.28 60.91 76.75 26.01% 
Net profit before taxes 15.45 13.87 17.61 24.16 28.82 19.29% 
Branches 48 59 72 96 112 16.67% 
Personnel 380 487 568 683 762 11.57% 
Members 88,475 101,370 114,670 129,577 144,176 11.27% 
Source: Association of Greek Co-operative Banks (2005) 
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) 
Panel A: DEA Inputs & Outputs  
 Y1 Y2 X1 X2 X3 P1 P2 P3 
Mean 58,201 3,462 1,514 51,030 38.795 0.251 0.038 20.293 
St dev 101,090 5,863 2,423 94,782 54.858 0.137 0.021 4.683 
Panel B: Tobit regression Independent variables   
 EQAS LOGAS BRANCHES ATMS GDPCAP UNEMPL INCOME INVGDP
Mean 0.278 4.530 4.493 3.556 13,610 10.873 0.053 0.301 
St dev 0.094 0.411 5.116 7.616 3,291 2.239 0.029 0.052 
Notes: Y1: loans, Y2: liquid assets & investments, X1: fixed assets, X2: deposits, X3: number of employees, P1: depreciation 
expenses/fixed assets, P2: interest expenses /deposits, P3: personnel expenses/number of employees; EQAS: equity to total assets, 
LOGAS: logarithm of total assets; BRANCHES: number of branches, ATMS: number of ATMs; GDPCAP: GDP per capita, 
UNEMPL: unemployment rate, INCOME: disposal income of households in the region as a percentage of the total disposal income 
of households in Greece; INVGDP: total gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP in the same geographical area;  All 
statistics in Panel B are  after replacing observations above the 95th percentile and below the 5th percentile with the corresponding 
values. This approach reduces the impact of outliers in the estimation of the parameters of the model while it allows retaining all 
observatories in sample. 
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Table 4 – Average efficiency scores by year 
Year No. of 
banks 
TE AE CE 
2000 14 0.938 0.886 0.832 
2001 14 0.912 0.898 0.820 
2002 14 0.914 0.911 0.836 
2003 15 0.927 0.883 0.823 
2004 16 0.915 0.877 0.802 
Mean (2000-04) 0.921 0.891 0.823 
Notes: TE: technical efficiency, AE: scale efficiency, CE: 
cost efficiency  
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Table 5 – Tobit regression results  
Panel A: Efficiency scores regressed over bank-specific 
attributes 
 TE AE CE 
EQAS 0.688*** 
(3.012) 
-0.210 
(-1.064) 
0.108 
(0.422) 
LOGAS 0.171* 
(1.713) 
0.170** 
(2.089) 
0.250** 
(2.542) 
BRANCHES -0.030*** 
(-2.855) 
-0.013 
(-1.532) 
-0.034*** 
(-2.581) 
ATMS 0.011** 
(2.429) 
0.002 
(0.609) 
0.012* 
(1.759) 
Constant 0.091 
(0.199) 
0.243 
(0.660) 
-0.218 
(-0.485) 
Panel B: Efficiency scores regressed over bank-specific 
attributes & market conditions 
 TE AE CE 
EQAS 0.617*** 
(2.639) 
-0.186 
(-1.210) 
0.117 
(0.590) 
LOGAS 0.187* 
(1.871) 
0.201*** 
(3.043) 
0.297*** 
(3.762) 
BRANCHES -0.026** 
(-2.545) 
-0.002 
(-0.156) 
-0.020 
(-1.568) 
ATMS 0.008* 
(1.796) 
-0.003 
(-0.509) 
0.004 
(0.603) 
GDPCAP -8.53E-06* 
(-1.735) 
-2.03E-05*** 
(-3.830) 
-2.47E-05*** 
(-3.997) 
UNEMPL -0.020*** 
(-2.895) 
-0.008 
(-0.934) 
-0.018** 
(-2.083) 
INCOME 0.836 
(1.020) 
1.119** 
(2.346) 
1.437** 
(2.390) 
INVGDP -0.227 
(-0.753) 
-0.364 
(-1.180) 
-0.361 
(-0.996) 
Constant 0.389 
(0.873) 
0.474 
(1.528) 
0.098 
(0.270) 
Notes: t-values in parenthesis, ***Statistically significant at the 1% level, 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level, * Statistically significant at the 
10% level; TE: technical efficiency, AE: allocative efficiency, CE: cost 
efficiency; EQAS: equity to total assets, LOGAS: logarithm of total 
assets; BRANCHES: number of branches, ATMS: number of ATMs; 
GDPCAP: GDP per capita, UNEMPL: unemployment rate, INCOME: 
disposal income of households in the region as a percentage of the total 
disposal income of households in Greece; INVGDP: total gross fixed 
capital formation as a percentage of GDP in the same geographical area;  
QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates have been calculated 
to control for heteroscedacity 
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